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1 Introduction
Behavioural analysis of criminal law exploits social science methodologies (behavioural 
economics, psychology and even sociology) to explore the effects of criminal law norms 
on criminals, judges, juries and other decision-makers, to determine the optimal type 
and size of criminal sanctions, to identify the optimal design of the enforcement system 
and the rules of evidence. Behavioural analysis of criminal law often addresses, criticises, 
or complements the findings of the traditional economic tools by using social sciences 
findings concerning the content of individuals’ beliefs, and the content of their prefer-
ences. As criminals, policepersons, victims of crime, judges, and other relevant agents 
form beliefs concerning probability of detection and conviction, and those affect the pro-
pensity to commit crimes, enforcement policy, evidence law and procedural law are as 
relevant to the understanding of the effects of criminal law as the substantive doctrines 
of criminal law itself. Hence both the economic and the behavioural approaches to the 
analysis of criminal law challenge the traditional doctrinal distinctions between criminal 
law, criminal procedure and evidence and, last, the enforcement policy.
The behavioural approach to criminal law is founded on the research of behavioural 
economists, psychologists and sociologists.1 Unlike traditional neo-classical economics, 
the behavioural perspective is eclectic rather than unitary; it is composed of various psy-
chological findings including cognitive biases and their effects, prospect theory, the effects 
1 For previous surveys of the behavioural approach to criminal law, see McAdams and Ulen, Behavioral 
Criminal Law and Economics, in 3 Criminal Law and Economics: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 403, 
ed. Garoupa (Edward Elgar 2009) pp. 413-426, Garoupa, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Crit-
ical Review, in EUR. J.L. & ECON. 15: 5, 8, 12-13 (2003), Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly 
Rational Actors, in The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior 268, eds. Parisi and Smith (Stanford Uni-
versity Press 2005) pp. 272-281. This survey differs however from these surveys as it aims also to explore 
the philosophical foundations of the field. For a general description of economic and behavioural approach 
to criminal law, see Harel, Economic Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, in Research Handbook on the 
Economics of Criminal Law, eds. Harel and Hylton (Edward Elgar 2012). 
* Phillip P. and Estelle G. Mizock Chair of Administrative and Criminal Law at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem. 
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of social norms, findings concerning the ways preferences and beliefs are being shaped 
and even studies concerning happiness. Behavioural theorists call for the exploitation of 
various cognitive misperceptions, biases and heuristics to increase the deterrent effect of 
criminal law prohibitions and sanctions and/or increase their effectiveness in other ways. 
This survey starts by examining in part 2 the theoretical foundations of behavioural 
analysis of criminal law. I contrast behavioural analysis with retributive justice values 
and, then, I contrast the behavioural approach to criminal law with traditional neo-clas-
sical economic analysis of criminal law and point out the distinctive features of the for-
mer. Part 3 illustrates the ways in which various behavioural phenomena can be used to 
understand the effects of criminal law norms and to design criminal law in a way that 
serves its social goals, in particular deterrence. Part 4 examines critically the potential 
contribution of behavioural studies to the optimal design of the legal system. 
2 Theoretical foundations
To understand the contribution of behavioural analysis of criminal law to the study of 
law one needs to point out what is distinctive about behavioural analysis of criminal 
law, namely in what ways behavioural analysis modifies the ways criminal law should 
be understood and/or reformed. In the first section of this Part, I contrast economic/be-
havioural analysis of criminal law with the traditional doctrinal/analytic approach based 
on retributive justice. In the second section I contrast the behavioural approach with its 
older relative – the traditional economic approach to criminal law – and examine the 
commonalities and the differences between these two fields.
2.1 Criminal law versus the economic/behavioural analysis of criminal law
The traditional criminal law theorist believes that the criminal law primarily guides 
people and instructs them. Criminal law sanctions ought to be imposed on agents who 
committed wrongful acts because they ‘deserve’ to be punished, and the severity of the 
criminal sanction ought to be proportionate to the wrongfulness of the act and to the 
culpability of the actor.2
Some retributivists oppose using criminal law for the sake of realising any social goals 
including deterrence and/or just distribution, as such a use violates the basic Kantian 
principle under which one ought not use a person only as a means (not even as a means 
to deter or prevent crimes).3 It is unjust to inflict a sanction on the person simply because 
2 Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (B. Blackwell 1990) p. 103, Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 
(Little, Brown and Company 1978) pp. 454-459, Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University 
Press 1981) pp. 363-397.
3 Rauscher, Kant’s social and Political Philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/ (last visited 12.5.2014). 
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such a sanction brings about socially desirable outcomes; the only justification for such a 
sanction is that the person ‘deserves’ it.
This view contrasts sharply with the view of law and economics and behavioural theo-
rists. Under their view, criminal law is a mechanism for preventing/deterring undesirable 
behaviour.4 Most typically criminal law norms (as well as other legal norms) are perceived 
as incentives for individuals to behave in a way that is socially optimal. A state of affairs 
that is socially optimal is often identified with efficiency, but it need not be identified only 
with efficiency. Distributive justice concerns could also be regarded as a legitimate goal of 
the economic/behavioural analysis.5 
Unlike the retributivist tradition which often regards punishment as desirable in itself 
irrespective of its consequences, economic and behavioural approaches regard punish-
ment as evil in itself (given its costs to society and to the criminal) but, it is at times a 
necessary evil to deter or prevent crime.6 
By regarding efficiency (or any other social goals) as the primary (or even exclusive) 
consideration underlying criminal law, economic analysis of law as well as behavioural 
analysis conflict with the retributivist tradition and, such a conflict inevitably triggers 
incongruities between criminal law as it is commonly justified and understood and the 
economic/behavioural approach to criminal law. Let me briefly explore two examples of 
such incongruity.
 The first incongruity touches upon fundamental assumptions concerning human 
rationality. In different ways the traditional criminal law approach and the law and eco-
nomics approach are founded on assumptions concerning rationality. In contrast the be-
havioural approach relies heavily on the irrationality of agents or, at least on assumptions 
concerning ‘bounded rationality’, namely, on the existence of limitations on rationality. 
Most typically, the behavioural approach to criminal law often calls for exploiting cogni-
tive errors and irrational human dispositions to deter or prevent crime. The policy rec-
ommendations of behavioural theorists in such cases are founded often on methods that 
can be described as manipulative and fraudulent. For instance it was argued that to deter 
parking violations one ought to use ‘tricks’ such as using ‘large, bright orange tickets that 
4 This view follows the utilitarian theory developed by Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation 74, eds. Burns and Hart (1996). Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
in Journal of Political Economy 76:169-217 (1968), used contemporary neo-classical economics tools to de-
velop Bentham’s insights. For a more legally informed doctrinal analysis of criminal law along these lines, 
see Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, in Columbia L. Rev. 85:1193 (1985).
5 Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative 
Fault. California L. Rev. 82:1181, 1201-8 (1994), Harel and Parcharmovsky, On Hate and Equality. Yale L.J. 
109:509 (1999). 
6 This was already the view of Bentham 1996 who maintained: ‘all punishment is mischief, all punishment in 
itself is evil.’ Bentham also inferred from this observation the principle of ‘frugality of punishment’, namely 
that punishment ought to be as small as possible to achieve its social goals. I believe it is unfortunate that 
this principle has been forgotten by contemporary legislators and judges. 
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read ‘VIOLATION’ in oversize letters on the drivers’ side window where they are clearly 
visible to other drivers passing by.’ The availability heuristic discussed below predicts that 
such a tactic would lead agents to overestimate the prospects of a parking ticket.7 
In contrast, classical retributivism is often based on claims concerning the rationality 
of individuals and their capacity to make informed moral judgments and act on their 
basis. Arguments concerning ‘free will’ of individuals and their capacity to make auton-
omous choices are deeply entrenched in the retributivist tradition. To illustrate, Antony 
Duff ’s ‘communicative theory’ justifies punishment by pointing out that punishment 
conveys moral condemnation of the wrongful act.8 The criminal process is described in 
his theory as a dialogue between the state and the criminal in which the state provides 
arguments and the criminal responds to these arguments. 
 The second important incongruity between criminal law as understood by tra-
ditional criminal law theorists and the economic/behavioural approach to criminal law 
focuses on what counts as punishment. The retributivist believes that punishment ought 
to be inflicted because criminals ‘deserve’ their punishment, and hence that what counts 
is the ex-post sanction – the actual punishment inflicted on the criminal. The retributivist 
acknowledges of course that sometimes the criminal is not detected and, hence, no pun-
ishment is inflicted. But once detected the criminal ought to suffer in proportion to the 
gravity of the crime. In contrast, economic and behavioural theorists of law regard crim-
inal law as an instrument designed to provide optimal incentives. The sanctions that are 
relevant for their enterprise are the ex-ante sanctions – the expected punishment taking 
into account the probability of detection. Harsher actual sanctions are necessary there-
fore to the extent that the probability of detection is low and vice versa. 
It follows from this analysis that distinctions that are central to legal doctrine such as 
the distinction between substantive criminal law, procedural law, evidence law, and the 
design of enforcement institutions, are perceived by economists and behavioural scien-
tists to be artificial. As the effectiveness of deterrence (as well as other social goals) hinges 
not only on the substantive doctrines of criminal law but also on the probability of detec-
tion and conviction, the law of evidence and the enforcement policy become central to 
the economic/behavioural analysis and are inseparable from the substantive doctrines of 
criminal law. One of the most interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive results of this 
approach is that under both the economic and the behavioural approach, the optimal size 
of the criminal sanction is inversely related to the probability of detection and conviction. 
This view differs sharply from the retributivist tradition, which believes that the actual 
(rather than expected) punishment ought to be proportionate to the wrongfulness of the 
act and the culpability of the actor. 
7 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. Stanford L. Rev. 50:1471 (1998). 
8 Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart University Press 2007). 
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2.2 Economic versus behavioural approaches to criminal law
The standard law and economics account of criminal behaviour begins with the observa-
tion that criminals (as well as other relevant agents such as judges, jurors, policepersons, 
and victims of crimes) are rational decision-makers.9 Rationality however is understood 
differently than the rationality as understood within the retributivist tradition. Rational 
individuals as understood within this tradition are self-interested; they decide whether to 
commit a crime on the basis of weighing the expected costs and benefits resulting from it. 
These costs and benefits are not merely monetary; they include non-monetary concerns 
including sadistic satisfaction, love of adventure risk, guilt feelings, stigma etc. 
The traditional economic analysis of criminal law explains human behaviour in terms 
of the expected costs and benefits of crime. These costs and benefits include parameters 
such as the probability of detection, the size of the sanction, the attitudes of individuals 
towards risk, the expected costs of the sanctions, etc. The basic premise of this analysis 
is that individuals make rational judgments on the basis of these parameters and guide 
their behaviour accordingly. 
Many of the behavioural theories examined in this article challenge this claim. For 
instance, it is pointed out that the expected sanctions do not guide people’s behaviour in 
mechanical or predictable ways. Criminal law influences individuals by modifying their 
beliefs and preferences. If there are systematic biases that distort the judgments of indi-
viduals, such biases alter individual behaviour and result in irrational behaviour. False 
beliefs concerning the severity of the sanction, the probability of detection etc. would 
inevitably lead the criminal either to commit crimes it is irrational for him to commit 
or not to commit crimes it is rational for him to commit. Yet, behavioural theorists also 
believe that such biases are not erratic or arbitrary; they are predictable and therefore can 
be exploited by policymakers. At the same time, behavioural law and economics main-
tains that policymakers/legislators themselves are also subject to such cognitive biases 
and those distort their judgments. Note that in the present context, the terminology of 
‘biases’ and ‘distortion’ is not meant to be normative but purely descriptive; it is meant to 
denote that the behaviour deviates from the assumptions of economic rationality. 
The dichotomy between rationality and irrationality is not always precise or easy to 
draw. The controversy concerning rationality is complicated given that many of the dis-
tortions identified by behavioural scientists may be rational in the long run as they serve 
(at least in the long run) to promote the interests of the agents. They often reflect there-
fore a difference between rationality with respect to any individual decision and rational-
ity in forming long-term rational strategies.10
9 Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life, in Nobel Lecture, Economics 1991-1995, ed. Persson (1997) 
pp. 38, 41. 
10 Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economists. AER 93:1449-75 (2003).
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The behavioural approach exploits empirical and experimental findings either to com-
plement or, at times, to challenge the premise of rationality of human agents. The differ-
ence between complementing and challenging deserves attention. Behavioural scientists 
complement the findings by attributing to individuals certain preferences on the basis of 
psychological observations. Thus, for instance, behavioural scientists may establish that 
under certain circumstances individuals can be risk-averse or risk-loving depending on 
the way they frame a given choice or that they discount future benefits hyperbolically. 
These dispositions are not required by rationality but they are not precluded by it either. 
At times behavioural scientists go further and challenge the findings of economic theo-
ry by pointing out that individuals are ‘irrational’; they form false or misguided beliefs 
which are not supported by the evidence at their disposal, (e.g., they are too optimistic); 
they assess probabilities on the basis of anecdotal evidence; they make decisions based 
on the ways circumstances are being presented to them (framing) and not on the basis 
of how things really are. In such cases individuals operate in ways that fail to maximise 
their own utility. 
The boundaries between complementing and challenging the findings of economic 
theory are not always clear, as it is not always clear what choices are rational or irratio-
nal. While it is always intellectually appealing for behavioural theorists to describe their 
findings as refuting the rationality of the agents, the question of whether such findings 
complement economic theory (by identifying the actual beliefs and preferences of indi-
viduals) or establish that individuals are irrational (because their beliefs or preferences 
are ‘irrational’), is less crucial than simply identifying the behavioural phenomena and 
their potential relevance to legislators, administrators, and judges. 
3 The behavioural approach to criminal law 
Being ultimately a critical methodology designed to complement and challenge the find-
ings of economic analysis of law, one traditional way of presenting behavioural findings 
is by contrasting them with the findings of traditional economic theory.11 In the follow-
ing discussion I shall follow this approach. At times however I will also contrast the be-
havioural findings with the retributivist tradition.
A word of caution: the behavioural analysis of law often applies general findings of 
behavioural science to the legal context. Psychologists investigate and make predictions 
as to how individuals act under uncertainty; what beliefs they form in different circum-
stances; what preferences they are disposed to adopt, etc. Legal theorists often apply these 
general predictions to the legal context. Such a methodology has risks as predictions con-
cerning the behaviour of human beings are often sensitive to the context, and individuals 
11 Harel, Economic Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal 
law 10, 2012. 
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facing a choice to commit a crime or to sentence criminals may behave differently than 
individuals facing choices in other contexts. To overcome this problem, behavioural law 
and economics theorists often examine empirically/experimentally the soundness of the 
general predictions in specific legal contexts. They do not apply automatically the general 
observations made by social scientists to the legal context. Instead they try to make inde-
pendent investigations that involve legal uncertainty. 
A much greater concern for the behavioural approach to law is the reliability of the 
behavioural method as such. Empirical/experimental research is currently a battlefield 
where different methodologies are being advocated and criticised, and theorists com-
ing from different methodological schools expose deficiencies of other methodologies. 
This survey does not examine these debates and it will use indiscriminately research by 
theorists coming from different schools including in particular behavioural economics, 
cognitive psychology, and sociology. The reliability of one method or another is of course 
important but, as my aim is illustrative, it is not necessary to explore this issue here. The 
rest of this part 3 examines various behavioural phenomena that are relevant to criminal 
law doctrine or related fields. 
3.1 Behavioural findings and their relevance to criminal law
As stated at the outset the behavioural analysis of law is an eclectic field. In this section I 
investigate various behavioural phenomena that are relevant to criminal law. The analysis 
is divided into two sub-sections. I first discuss behavioural phenomena that are individu-
al and psychological, and then behavioural phenomena that are primarily sociological as 
they involve social interaction among individuals.
3.1.1 Psychological findings and the law 
Behavioural observations on the optimal design of  
criminal sanctions and probability of detection 
Criminal law differentiates sharply between the size of the sanction and the probability of 
detection and conviction. The size of the criminal sanction ought to reflect the serious-
ness and hideousness of the crime. The more hideous the crime, the harsher the sanction 
ought to be. Murder is ordinarily more serious wrong than burglary, and burglary is more 
serious than theft. The punishments for the different offences should reflect the hierarchy 
or gravity of the offence. Under this view, there is no relation between the probability of 
detection and conviction, and the size of the sanction. Empirical studies indicate that the 
traditional strict separation between these two questions reflects not only legal doctrine 
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but also the moral intuitions of most people. Individuals believe that the size of the sanc-
tion ought not to depend on the probability of detection.12 
Economic analysis of criminal law rejects this view. The primary purpose of criminal 
sanctions is to deter individuals from anti-social behaviour. Increasing the probability of 
detection and conviction, and increasing the size of the sanction, are both congenial to 
deterrence. Both the probability of detection and conviction and the size of the sanction 
determine the size of the expected sanction, and it is the expected sanction that matters 
from the perspective of deterrence. As the expected sanction should not exceed what is 
necessary for the purpose of deterrence, it follows that the harsher the sanction, the lesser 
the probability of detection and conviction ought to be, and vice versa. 
The legal system ought to determine not only the size of the expected sanction but 
also the size of the expected sanction’s components: the probability of detection and con-
viction on the one hand and the size of the sanction on the other. In his seminal article 
on the economics of criminal law, Gary Becker provides a simple, compelling, and high-
ly counter-intuitive answer to this question.13 Under Becker’s view, the answer to this 
question depends on the costs of increasing the size of the sanction on the one hand and 
increasing the probability of detection on the other. Becker maintains that if increasing 
the probability of detection is much more costly to society than increasing the size of the 
sanction, it follows that the legal system ought to inflict harsh sanctions even for the most 
trivial offences.14 
The possibility that efficiency may under certain plausible conditions require increas-
ing sanctions and reducing the probability of detection horrified even the most orthodox 
advocates of law and economics who tried hard to provide counter-arguments. For in-
stance some theorists argued that harsh sanctions may have negative implications as they 
induce offenders to increase their investment in precautions, and therefore it may have 
negative effects on the probability of detection and conviction.15 Further it was argued 
that imposing harsh sanctions for all crimes undermines marginal deterrence; if I already 
committed a parking offence for which I am liable to be executed, I would not be deterred 
from committing more serious crimes, e.g., killing eyewitnesses.16 
12 Sunstein, Schkade, and Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence, in Journal of Legal Studies 29:237 
(2000), Baron and Ritov, The Role of Probability of Detection in Judgments of Punishment, in Journal of 
Legal Analysis 1:553-90 (2009). 
13 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in Journal of Political Economy 76:169-217 (1968) 
pp. 183 – 184. 
14 Ibid.
15 Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress Shadow, in Cornell L. Rev. 90:1411 (2005).
16 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Wolters Kluwer for Aspen Publishers 2007). I think that despite the fact 
that this is considered the standard and the most compelling efficiency-based reply to Becker’s challenge 
this explanation fails. Even if the sanctions are harsh, marginal deterrence can be guaranteed by differen-
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The behavioural tradition addresses this concern differently. Behavioural scientists 
explore which components of the criminal sanctions have a greater deterrent effect: the 
probability of detection or the size of the sanction. More specifically, they argue that 
while both increasing the sanction and elevating the probability of detection affect crim-
inal behaviour, they need not necessarily have identical effects.
To clarify this point, let us define the concepts of risk neutral, risk averse and risk 
loving individuals. An individual is risk neutral to sanctions if he is indifferent as to two 
sanctions with equal expected value. A fine of $10,000 with a 1% probability of detection 
deters such an individual to the same degree as a fine of $100 with a 100% probability 
of detection. An individual is risk averse if he is deterred more by a harsh sanction with 
a low probability of detection (e.g., $10,000 with a 1% probability of detection) than by 
a light sanction with a high probability of detection (e.g., $100 with a 100% probability 
of detection). A risk loving individual is deterred more by a light sanction with a high 
probability of detection (e.g., $100 with a 100% probability of detection) than by a harsh 
sanction with a low probability of detection (e.g., $10,000 with a 1% probability of detec-
tion). If individuals are risk averse, the policymaker can increase deterrence by imposing 
harsh sanctions with low probabilities of detection; if individuals are risk loving, deter-
rence may be increased by imposing light sanctions with high probabilities of detection.
Criminology research has been struggling with the question what has greater influ-
ence on criminal behaviour: the certainty or severity of the criminal sanctions.17 While 
empirical researchers debate this issue there are behavioural phenomena that support the 
claim that certainty should have greater effects than severity, namely that individuals are 
risk loving; they are deterred more by low sanctions with high probabilities of detection 
than by harsh sanctions with low probabilities of detection. 
Take first the case of incarceration. Increasing the size of a sanction from a one-year to 
a two-year prison term does not double the deterrent effects of the sanction, because of a 
psychological phenomenon called discounting of the future.18 Compare Arthur, who ex-
pects to go to the dentist tomorrow and have a painful treatment, with Betty, who expects 
to go to the dentist next month. Arthur is anxious and wakes up at night anticipating the 
pain while Betty has no anxiety at this point. Individuals tend to discount the significance 
tiating the probability of detection for light and grave offences, i.e. by investing greater effort in detecting 
grave offences. For another explanation along the lines of traditional law and economics, see Polinsky and 
Shavell, Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, in Journal of Public Economics 24:89 (1984).
17 Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, in Economic Inquiry, v29 n2 (April 1991) pp. 297-309. 
18 For an accessible explanation of discounting, see Shane, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghu, Time Discounting 
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in Journal of Economic Literature XL:351-401 (2002). For an appli-
cation to the case of incarceration, see Harel and Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: 
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, in American Law and Economics 
Review 1:295 (1999). Some theorists raised the conjecture that long periods of imprisonment have very 
small deterrent effect because of ‘hyperbolic discounting’, see Garoupa 2003 pp. 12–13, Bronsteen, Bucca-
fusco and Masur, Happiness and Punishment, in University of Chicago Law Review 76 no. 3 (2009). 
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of distant future events. It follows that a second year of imprisonment (which inevitably 
starts only after the end of the first year) has a lesser deterrent effect than the first year 
(which starts immediately after conviction). A prison term of one year with a 2% proba-
bility of detection has a greater deterrent effect than two years with a 1% probability.
Another relevant explanation is based on the observation that legal sanctions are only 
part of the overall sanctions imposed on criminals. The criminal also suffers from stig-
ma, which in turn often has both monetary and non-monetary effects on the criminal.19 
Criminal conviction exposes the criminal to both legal and social sanctions. Assume 
that conviction exposes the criminal to a legal sanction of $100 and to a social sanction 
worth $100 to him. The sanction is effectively $200. Assume also that the probability of 
detection is 1% and the expected overall sanction (consisting of the legal and non-legal 
sanction) is therefore $2. If the state increases the legal sanction from $100 to $200, the 
overall sanction increases from $200 to $300 and the expected sanction increases as a 
result to $3. Doubling the size of the (legal) fine in this case from $100 to $200 does not 
double the overall sanction. Yet doubling the probability from 1% to 2% would double 
the expected sanction from $2 to $4. Increasing the probability of detection has a greater 
effect on deterrence than increasing the sanction.20 
Behavioural effects of uncertainty: the punishment and the detection roulettes
Criminal law tradition is committed to reducing as much as possible any uncertainty or 
unpredictability as to the scope of criminal offences and the size of the criminal sanction. 
Such certainty and predictability is required by principles of the rule of law and, conse-
quently, such a principle is often entrenched in bills of rights and constitutions.21 On the 
other hand, there is no attempt on the part of the social planner to guarantee certainty 
with respect to the probability of detection or conviction. 
To illustrate, consider the following example. Arnold and Betty commit an identical 
offence under similar circumstances. Arnold is sentenced to 10 years, while Betty is sen-
tenced to 5 years. This gap seems unjust and may perhaps provide grounds for appeal. 
There is no reason why different sanctions are imposed on individuals who committed 
identical offences under identical circumstances. In contrast, assume that when Arnold 
commits the offence, police invest little in enforcement and, consequently, the probability 
of detection is low. The police then increase the investment in detection, and when Betty 
commits the offence, she is caught as a result of this special effort by the police. It is diffi-
19 On the dramatic monetary repercussions of criminal conviction, see Lott, An Attempt at Measuring the 
Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of Individual Reputation, in Journal of 
Legal Studies 21:159-87 (1992). 
20 Traditional law and economic theorists could easily accept such an analysis and, strictly speaking, this 
observation ought not to be classified as ‘behavioural’. I include it here as some behavioural scientists often 
emphasise the significance of stigma.
21 Harel and Segal 1999 pp. 281 – 285. 
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cult to claim in such a case that Betty was discriminated against even if she could not have 
known when she committed the offence that the police would increase its investment in 
detection, and even if she can prove that she would not have been caught unless the police 
changed its enforcement policy.
Another indication of the difference between uncertainty with respect to the size of 
the sanction and uncertainty with respect to the probability of detection can be found in 
the information given to individuals. Criminal law provides information with respect to 
the size of criminal sanctions; it does not provide such information with respect to the 
probability of detection. Criminal law doctrine guarantees that the sanctions meted out 
would not be more severe than the one in force when the offence was committed, but it 
does not guarantee that the probability of detection remains fixed. It is a basic principle 
of criminal law (and it is part of the rule of law more generally) that increasing a sanction 
for a criminal offence does not apply retroactively. A potential criminal can ‘rely’ on the 
size of a sanction as is specified in the law at the time she commits the offence. On the 
other hand, typically no legal system allows a criminal to argue that the probability of 
detection increased after the offence was committed. 
More generally, different legal ethos governs the size of legal sanctions and the prob-
ability of detection. The severity of the criminal sanction reflects the seriousness of the 
offence; hence, the legal system is committed to consistency in inflicting sanctions. Most 
importantly, it is committed to providing ‘fair warning’ to criminals with respect to the 
size of the criminal sanctions. The detailed American Sentencing Guidelines are perhaps 
the most evident manifestation of the commitment of the criminal law system to provide 
a fair and precise warning. On the other hand, the probability of detection is under the 
dominant tradition a function of pragmatic considerations, which change from time to 
time. The legal system rejects punishment roulettes and tries to guarantee certainty and 
predictability with respect to the size of the sanction. It does not, however, oppose detec-
tion roulettes and the probability of detection is subject to uncertainty. 
The differential treatment of punishment on the one hand and probability of detection 
on the other hand appears natural to traditional criminal lawyers, but from an economic 
perspective it is puzzling. After all economic analysis of law regards both punishment and 
detection as components of the expected sanction. Why should there be such a major dif-
ference between the treatment of the size of the sanction and the probability of detection?
A natural way to justify the differential treatment is to explain it on behavioural 
grounds as an effective means to increase deterrence. This justification is based on the 
expected reaction of a criminal to punishment roulette on the one hand and probability 
of detection roulette on the other hand.22 To illustrate, compare the two following legal 
systems. Under the first system, every convicted thief is sentenced to two years in prison. 
Under the second system, there is a sentencing roulette that inflicts a sanction of three 
22 Ibid.
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years in prison on 50% of thieves and one year in prison on the other 50% of thieves. The 
expected sanction is two years in prison. Which system is more effective? 
The answer to this question depends on the deterrent effects of each one of these 
systems. If thieves were risk averse, they would prefer the first system to the second sys-
tem, and, consequently, sentencing roulette would have greater deterrent effect. If, on the 
other hand, thieves are risk loving they would prefer sentencing roulette, and therefore 
the deterrent effect of a certain sanction would be greater. Similar observations can be 
made with respect to the probability of detection roulette. If criminals prefer probability 
of detection roulette over a known probability (e.g., 50% of the criminals are caught with 
a probability of 1% and 50% with a probability of 3%), the deterrent effect of probability 
of detection roulette would be lower than the deterrent effect of a known probability (2%) 
and vice versa.
We can now evaluate the desirability of sentencing roulette on the one hand and 
probability of detection roulette on the other. As we saw earlier, the existing legal sys-
tem rejects the sentencing roulette but endorses the probability of detection roulette. The 
current system is justified only if criminals are risk loving with respect to sentences but 
risk averse with respect to the probability of detection. There are indeed good reasons 
to believe so. As demonstrated above, criminals are likely to be risk loving with respect 
to terms of incarceration because of their disposition to discount future costs. Hence, 
predictable (fixed) terms of incarceration (e.g., 2 years in prison) are likely to deter indi-
viduals more than risky terms with the same expected length (50% of 1 year in prison and 
50% of 3 years in prison). In other words, due to the discounting of the future criminals 
are likely to value the year they may gain by the lottery (the second year in prison) more 
than the year they may lose by the lottery (the third year) and hence they are likely to 
prefer a lottery over a fixed term in prison.
The infliction of fines requires a different analysis since unlike years in jail the entire 
fine is paid at once. There is however theoretical support for the view that criminals are 
risk-loving also with respect to fines. One of the major findings of prospect theory is that 
individuals are (typically) risk-averse with respect to gains but risk-loving with respect 
to losses. To determine whether a person is risk-averse or risk-loving one ought first to 
identify whether the agent perceives the decision as involving a loss or a gain. The sub-
jective perception of a decision as involving a gain or a loss is often highly sensitive to 
the way the decision is described to the agent and to the context in which the decision is 
being made. Thus, if individuals face a choice between an 80% probability of gaining $100 
or receiving (for certain) $80 they would prefer receiving $80. In contrast, if individuals 
face a choice between an 80% probability of losing $100 or losing (for certain) $80, they 
would prefer the lottery to the loss.
Punishment is naturally understood as a cost and consequently, under prospect the-
ory one would expect criminals to be risk loving with respect to a sentencing lottery 
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involving fines. These observations support the existing legal regulation of uncertainty 
under which sentences are certain and predictable and probabilities of detection are not. 
Yet, given the sensitivity of risk propensities to the ‘framing’ of the decision as in-
volving either a loss or a gain, one may reach also other conclusions. In an experiment 
designed to examine the risk propensities of individuals to criminal fines, it was found 
that the transition from a certain/predictable schemes of fines to a risky scheme of prob-
abilistic fines increased rather than decreased the effectiveness of deterrence.23 One pos-
sible explanation is that individuals do not evaluate the sanction in isolation; instead they 
evaluate it in conjunction with the expected benefits of the crime. In deciding whether to 
commit a crime individuals discount the costs (fines) from the benefits and, if the sum 
is positive, they treat their decision as a decision involving gains. Prospect theory would 
in such a case predict that criminals would be risk-averse, and if they are risk-averse the 
optimal sanction ought to be probabilistic.
This example illustrates that behavioural science predictions are often not well de-
fined. Punishment is clearly a cost to individuals who commit crimes. But it cannot be 
assumed without further investigation that criminals treat punishment as a cost or that 
their risk propensities with respect to criminal sanctions are aligned with the predictions 
of prospect theory concerning losses. What determines whether a person is risk-averse 
or risk-loving is the framing of the decision by the agent as a gain or a loss and not any 
external or ‘objective’ judgment as to its nature. As one theorist argued: ‘[w]hile the pre-
dictions of prospect theory are clear once a reference point has been established…it is far 
less clear what constitutes a reference point’.24 
How to enrich the State by using prospect theory
Tax evasion is among the most common criminal offences and many resources are in-
vested in an effort to reduce its scope. Behavioural scientists believe that prospect theory 
may be used to reduce the scope of tax evasion.25
As mentioned above, prospect theory predicts that individuals have differential at-
titudes towards risk. Risk attitudes are different in cases in which the decision involve 
probabilistic gains and cases in which the decision involves probabilistic losses. While 
23 Baker, Harel and Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, in Iowa L. Rev. 
89:457-68 (2004).
24 Teichman, The Optimism Bias of the Behavioral Analysis of Crime Control, in University of Illinois L. Rev. 
1696 (2011). This is part of a larger concern raised by Teichman, namely the concern that some cognitive 
phenomena are indeterminate. I investigate this concern at greater length below. 
25 Yaniv, Tax Compliance and Advance Tax Payments, in National Tax Journal 52:753 (1999) pp. 1700 - 1701, 
see also Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference and the Law, in Northwestern University L. Rev. 97:1115, 
1142-45 (2002-2003). 
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individuals are risk averse with respect to gains, they are often risk loving with respect to 
losses. 
Tax evasion can be described as a lottery. The individual faces a choice to pay his taxes 
or to pay a smaller amount but to face a risk that, if caught, he would be subject to a large 
fine. The inclination to take risks hinges on the question of whether individuals perceive 
the lottery as a lottery designed to increase their gains or to reduce their losses. Further, 
the state can influence (at least to some extent) whether the lottery is perceived as mini-
mising losses or maximising gains. Thus, the state can partially control the risk attitudes 
of individuals and manipulate them to promote its ends, namely to reduce tax evasion.
One instrument used by the state is advance tax payment. The state deducts money 
during the year and, at the end of the year, the taxpayer is required to provide an annual 
report of his income. If the income is larger than the evaluation on the basis of which the 
advance payments were made, the taxpayer pays the difference to the state. If the income 
is lower than the evaluation on the basis of which the advance payments were made, the 
tax authorities pay back the difference to the taxpayer. Should the state make a high eval-
uation of the income (and therefore most likely return money to the taxpayer at the end 
of the year) or should it make a low evaluation of the income (and charge the difference 
from the taxpayer at the end of the year)?
Prospect theory would recommend that the state make a high evaluation. High ad-
vance tax payments mean that tax evasion is a lottery over gains rather than losses. The 
taxpayer has already made the payment and he expects to get a return which, it is likely, 
will be perceived by him as a gain. Given the prediction of prospect theory that individu-
als are risk loving with respect to losses, one may expect that individuals would be more 
inclined to engage in tax evasion under a scheme in which the advance payments are 
small (and therefore the lottery involves losses) than in a scheme in which the advance 
payments are high (and therefore the lottery involves gains). Deterrence considerations 
suggest therefore that the state ought to prefer a system in which advance payments are 
high over a system in which advance payments are low, as high advance payments will 
result in greater compliance with the law.
Prediction postdiction and the law
Much of the discussion so far has focused on uncertainty. One of the interesting findings 
related to decision-making in uncertain situations is the differential treatment of future 
versus past uncertainty.26 Psychological research suggests that individuals are less willing 
to bet on past events than on future events. 
Assume that you have to bet on the result of tossing a die. In one case the die has al-
ready been tossed while in a second case the experimenter is going to toss it. It seems as 
26 Guttel and Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal Postdiction, in Michigan L. Rev. 
107:467 (2008).
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if there is no difference between the cases. The probability of guessing correctly in both 
cases is identical. However, experimental research indicates that individuals react differ-
ently in these cases.27 In another famous experiment, subjects were asked to choose be-
tween two possible bets: one involved guessing whether a particular stock had increased 
or decreased in value on the day prior to the experiment and the second involved guess-
ing whether a particular stock would increase or decrease in value on the day after the 
experiment. The results indicated that 70% of individuals preferred the second bet.28 It is 
shown below that the social planner can use the differential attitudes toward the past and 
future uncertainty in order to increase the deterrent effects of criminal law.
Precautions against crime are divided into two types. Some precautions operate be-
fore the crime is committed (e.g., cameras and LoJacks). Other precautions operate after 
the crime is committed (e.g., police patrols). The empirical findings concerning uncer-
tainty indicate that precautions of the first type are more effective than precautions of the 
second type. In the case of the first type of precautions, the criminal bets on precautions, 
which operate at the time the offence is committed. He is asked therefore to bet on a die 
that has already been tossed, e.g., on the question of whether a camera documents his 
behaviour. In the case of the second type of precautions, the criminal is asked to guess the 
probability of a future event, e.g., a police patrol. The differential treatment of prediction 
and postdiction suggests that criminals are more likely to bet in the second case than in 
the first. Consequently, the first type of precautions is more effective. 
One way to illustrate this point is to re-examine the operation of tax enforcement au-
thorities. Typically, tax authorities use samples of individuals who are selected randomly. 
The sample is selected at the end of year. Taxpayers who consider committing fraud bet 
on the future; they bet that their names will not come up in the sample. It is easy to see 
how the system can change such that taxpayers bet on the past rather than on the future. 
If the lottery takes place not at the end of the year but at the beginning of the year, the 
taxpayers bet not on the question of whether their names will come up on the sample but 
whether their names already appear in the sample. This latter bet has greater deterrent 
effects.
The availability heuristic and criminal law
The traditional economic approach explores the influence of the size of sanctions and the 
probability of detection on deterrence. Behavioural economists argue that deterrence is 
not a product of the actual size of a sanction or the probability of detection but a product 
of the beliefs concerning the size of the sanction and the probability of detection. Can 
27 Rothbart and Snyder, Confidence in the Prediction and Postdiction of an Uncertain Outcome, in Can.J.Be-
hav.Sci. 2: 38 (1970). 
28 Heath and Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty (Stanford 
University 1990) pp. 5 – 28. 
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we examine how these beliefs are formed and shaped? Can we affect the content of these 
beliefs?
Some (and perhaps most) readers of this article have considered once or twice in their 
life whether to speed or to park illegally.29 In such cases those readers also thought of the 
potential risks of such behaviour: the risk of being fined. But (with the possible exception 
of the fine for illegal parking) it is likely that the readers did not know the precise sanc-
tions for such behaviour and certainly did not know the probability of detection. 
How did those who decided to speed (or not to speed) or to park illegally and risk a 
fine (or drive for the third time around the block and look for a legal parking space) form 
their decision? There is perhaps one parameter that influences greatly such a decision. If 
on the evening before the event, one of your friends complained about getting a speeding 
ticket or you read in the paper a report on a police campaign against speeding, you are 
more likely to comply with the law. Psychologists call this phenomenon availability. The 
term ‘availability’ denotes the disposition of individuals to form their beliefs on the basis 
of anecdotal information, which they can easily recall from memory.30 A famous example 
corroborating the availability heuristic is based on the following experiment. Individuals 
are asked how many seven-letter words in a 2,000-word section of a novel end in ‘ing’ 
give much larger estimates than individuals asked how many words in such a section 
have ‘n’ as the second-to-last letter, despite the fact that objectively there are more words 
which satisfy the latter than the former. It is simply the case that individuals can more 
easily recall examples of the former type of words than the type of the latter. More rele-
vant for us is the finding that people tend to overestimate vivid/salient risks, such as car 
and plane accidents, school shootings, nuclear accidents, and underestimate less visible 
or publicised risks, such as heart disease. The former are well publicised and therefore 
people tend to overestimate the prospect that they may occur. 
Our beliefs concerning the size of sanctions and the probability of detection are not 
formed by reading the penal law or reading the annual statistics collected by the police. 
Empirical findings show that individuals have little information both with respect to the 
size of the criminal sanctions and with respect to the probability of detection.31 Instead 
these beliefs are often formed by a story we read in the news or an anecdote told by a 
neighbour. 
Some theorists proposed to use the availability bias to reduce the rate of illegal park-
ing by using colourful and visible parking tickets. The argument is that neighbours and 
29 Interestingly this was the trigger for the seminal article on the subject of criminal law and economics by 
Becker, see Becker 1997 pp. 38, 41. It seems that the only offence that can excite the minds of professors are 
speeding or parking offences.
30 Tversky and Kahneman, Availability; A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in Cognitive Psy-
chology 5:207 (1973). 
31 Robinson and Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation. in Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 24:173-205 (2004). 
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pedestrians will remember such tickets, thus creating great deterrent effects.32 More gen-
erally, this view would imply that to be effective, enforcement activity ought to be sa-
lient and vivid such that it will be registered in the minds of potential criminals. The 
availability bias also suggests that the public punishments used in the Middle Ages (e.g., 
public flogging or public execution) was congenial to deterrence not because it provided 
accurate information concerning the probability of detection, but because it provided 
a memorable and salient reminder to individuals of the risks of conviction. Imposing 
overly harsh sanctions and publicising this fact may arguably be conducive to deterrence 
for this reason.33
It has also been pointed out that the availability heuristic influences not only potential 
criminals but the public opinion and this may lead to sub-optimal legislation or sub-op-
timal law enforcement policies. One theorist argued, for instance, that ‘in criminal law, 
street crime (theft and violent crime) is especially vivid and frightful for most people. In 
contrast, white-collar crimes, such as financial frauds in which many victims lose small 
amounts, seem much less threatening’.34 
The availability heuristic may affect not only decisions by people subject to the law, but 
also the decisions of policy-makers. Judges may impose harsher sanctions on criminals 
who have committed crimes that are salient. Crimes that they can easily recall from the 
press may be perceived as more threatening. More particularly they may perceive such 
crimes to be more common that they really are. Anecdotal evidence may influence their 
judgments in ways that do not accurately reflect the reality. Interest groups may exploit 
the availability heuristic by using anecdotal evidence designed to affect public opinion. 
For instance, potential victims of crime may overinvest in precautions against crime due 
to the intentional manipulation on the part of firms expected to gain from selling such 
precautions. To do so, such firms need not lie about the frequency of crime; they simply 
need to publicise anecdotal horrific stories concerning crime. 
Over-optimism and criminal law 
One of the persistent finding of behavioural scientists is that individuals tend to be 
over-optimistic. For instance it was noted that individuals tend to believe that they are 
very unlikely to divorce even at the face of the statistics indicating a very high rate of 
divorce. It has been claimed that over-optimism weakens deterrence by both causing po-
32 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in Stanford L. Rev. 50:1471 
(1998) p. 1538. 
33 Legal theorists have used this argument to justify the imposition of capital punishment. It was argued that 
given the salience of capital punishment, it would be highly effective, see Sunstein and Vermeule, Is Capital 
Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, in Stan L. Rev. 58:703, 714 (2005) 
p. 714. 
34 Brown, Costs Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, in California L. Rev. 92:323, 342 (2004) p. 342 .
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tential criminals to overestimate the benefits resulting from crime and to underestimate 
the probability of detection and the size of the sanctions.35 
Policy-makers ought to take these factors into account in determining the size of the 
expected sanction, and impose a harsher expected sanction than the sanction sufficient 
to deter individuals who calculate correctly the expected costs and benefits of crime. 
One may doubt, however, the degree to which the optimism bias should be used by pol-
icymakers. As potential criminals often have no knowledge concerning the probability 
of detection, it is not necessarily the case that one can take the actual probabilities of 
detection as a starting point and infer that criminals’ subjective assessments of the prob-
ability of detection are lower. It was also pointed out that over optimism may cause crim-
inals to underinvest in precautions, i.e., to be less careful; and such underinvestment on 
their part may be conducive to law enforcement.36 Further over-optimism may also affect 
the behaviour of victims of crime and cause them to undervalue the risks of crime and 
consequently to underinvest in precautions against crime. This may require policy-mak-
ers to increase rather than decrease sanctions. The different effects of over-optimism on 
criminals and on victims of crime make it particularly difficult to know whether overall 
criminal sanctions ought to be harsher or lighter than the sanctions sufficient to deter 
individuals who calculate correctly the expected costs and benefits of crime. 
Last, over-optimism may affect judges who may over-estimate the deterrent effects 
of sanctions and thereby impose harsher sanctions than optimal. They may therefore be 
too optimistic as to the influence of sanctions on the frequency of crimes and therefore 
impose sanctions that are excessive. Drawing attention to over-optimism of judges may 
perhaps ‘de-bias’ judges, namely enable them to provide more accurate evaluations and 
thus to be more realistic about the limitations of criminal sanctions.
Positive criminal duties: the duty of rescue 
Criminal law typically consists of negative duties: it prohibits individuals from commit-
ting murders, thefts, and rapes. Liberal criminal law theorists are reluctant to impose 
positive duties. Yet this reluctance is not universally accepted. The approach of common 
law systems on the one hand and European or religious systems on the other hand is 
different; the former systems are much more reluctant to impose a duty of rescue. Pos-
itive duties exist in criminal law even in common law systems, but they typically hinge 
on the existence of prior relationships (such as the parent-child relationship) or special 
circumstances (such as drivers who observe a traffic accident). A classic case illustrating 
the common law’s reluctance to impose positive duties is its refusal to embrace so-called 
‘good Samaritan’ duties – i.e., duties to rescue.37 
35 Garoupa 2003 p. 9.
36 Ibid.
37 Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, in Yale L.J. 90:247 (1980).
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Traditionally, the reluctance to impose positive duties is justified on grounds of auton-
omy. The legal system ought to protect the ‘negative liberty’ of individuals but it cannot 
dictate to them what to do. Richard Posner and William Landes think that legal respon-
sibility for failing to rescue characterises communist or fascist legal systems, because the 
imposition of responsibility is a form of ‘conscription for the social service’.38 Under this 
view, individuals ought to be legally required not to cause harm to others but they ought 
not to have any legal obligations whatsoever to help others. Can the absence of positive 
duties in the common law be justified?
Arguably, it is very difficult to explain the absence of positive duties on economic 
grounds. The utilitarian tradition, which provides the normative foundations for eco-
nomic analysis of law, imposes very demanding duties on individuals. Maximising utility 
requires one individual to help another as long as the marginal utility resulting from one’s 
efforts is greater than the costs. My duty is therefore to serve the beggars of Jerusalem 
instead of sitting in my air-conditioned office and writing this text.39 Naturally, it does not 
follow that the legal system ought always to impose such duties, as sometimes there are 
grave costs to legal enforcement. Yet it is quite difficult to explain in economic terms why, 
if I sit on the beach watching birds while my desperate friend is struggling to save his life 
in the water, the law ought not impose a legal duty to interrupt my favourite hobby and 
throw a rope to save him.
It is evident that often individuals engage in rescue even without a legal duty to do 
so.40 But it seems that imposing legal sanctions would increase the willingness to rescue. 
One challenge to this view rests on behavioural conjectures, and especially on the in-
fluential conjecture of Richard Titmuss in his famous book, The Gift Relationship from 
Human Blood to Social Policy.41 In this book, Titmuss identifies a psychological phenom-
enon that he labels ‘crowding out’. Titmuss explores the practice of blood donations, com-
paring the American practice (in which blood donors receive monetary compensation) 
with the British practice (in which blood donors get no such compensation). Titmuss 
found that the willingness to donate blood in Britain is greater than the willingness to 
donate blood in the U.S. despite the absence of monetary compensation in Britain. His 
claim (which is highly controversial) is that monetary compensation reduces or annuls 
altruistic incentives, and therefore, the blood supply in a society in which blood donors 
receive monetary compensation may be lower than in a society in which blood donors 
receive no such compensation. 
38 Posner and Landes, Altruism in Law and Economics, in American Economic Review 68:417 (1972). 
39 Hills, Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness, in Philosophical Quarterly 60:225 (2010). 
40 Heyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, in Texas L. Rev. 84:653-
738 (2006).
41 Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, eds. Oakley and Ashton (New Press 
1997). 
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 Titmuss focuses his attention on monetary incentives ‘crowding out’ altruistic 
motivations, but his hypothesis can apply also to legal (and in particular criminal) sanc-
tions ‘crowding out’ the same altruistic motivations. Under this view, by imposing a crim-
inal law duty, law may weaken rather than strengthen the disposition of individuals to 
invest in rescue. Individuals may invest in rescuing precisely because they perceive it as 
a moral duty. Imposing legal responsibility for failing to rescue may turn the act from an 
act of charity, indicating the virtues of the rescuer, into an act that is merely done out of 
compliance with the law. Hence, legal sanctions may ‘crowd out’ the altruistic motiva-
tions and thus reduce the willingness to rescue.42
3.1.2 Sociological findings and criminal law
Criminal law and social norms 
Social Norms Theory is based on the conjecture that there is an interaction between 
law and social norms. This view rejects the equation of criminal law sanctions as costs 
that decrease the inclination of criminal behaviour. While criminal law sanctions are 
also costs they are not only costs. Instead, the legal sanction itself influences individual 
preferences and social attitudes, and much of the influence of criminal law hinges on the 
resulting changes in preferences and also social pressures and stigma. 
One branch of the social norms movement maintains that criminal behaviour is not 
determined primarily by the size of sanctions or the probability of detection. A person’s 
criminal behaviour is influenced to a larger extent by the behaviour of other members 
of the person’s social group, the rate of compliance in the society as a whole, perceptions 
of the justness of the legal system, etc.43 The view under which law is merely an external 
incentive whose size is determined by legal sanctions does not reflect reality. In fact, there 
is an ongoing interaction between legal norms and social norms. The legal norms and the 
size of the sanctions inflicted on violators influence one’s inclinations to perform the act 
and her perception as to whether such an act is morally appropriate. The effectiveness of 
the enforcement of criminal law norms determines to a large extent the social attitudes 
towards the legal norms and, in particular, the social norms governing behaviour.
A famous example identified with the social norms movement can illustrate these 
conjectures. The ‘broken windows’ metaphor is used to convey the idea that the willing-
ness of individuals to obey the law depends on their environment. In particular, the the-
ory posits that minor violations – graffiti, abandoned buildings, garbage, etc. – regularly 
42 This conjecture may also be supported by Gneezy and Rostechini, A Fine is a Price, in Journal of Legal 
Studies 29:1-17 (2000). In this case it was documented that once a fine was imposed on parents who are late 
in picking up their children from day-care, the amount of late arrivals increased. 
43 Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press 2000), Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning 
and Deterrence, in Virginia L. Rev. 83:349 (1997).
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encourage criminal activity.44 This conjecture led the former mayor of New York City, 
Rudy Giuliani, to strictly punish such minor violations, as he believed that individuals 
adjust their behaviour not to the expected sanction but to the norms of behaviour pre-
vailing among their neighbours and friends.45 
In a famous experiment, the psychologist Phillip Zimbardo left a car with a broken 
window unattended and documented the resulting vandalism. Zimbardo found that the 
car had a negative effect on the behaviour of individuals.46 The influence of social norms 
has different explanations, some of which can be accommodated within the frame of 
neo-classical economics. One explanation is the ‘signalling’ theory. Under this theory, 
individuals gain information from their environment with respect to the level of enforce-
ment. Thus, minor violations (such as graffiti or broken windows) signal to individuals 
that the social order has collapsed and the probability of detection is low; therefore, crime 
is beneficial. Another explanation is based on the stigma effects of minor violations. If 
stigma is affected by the crime rate, a high rate for a crime indicates that there is no stig-
ma attached to the crime. 
 Despite these observations it is important to note that these observations are 
highly controversial; the ‘broken windows’ theory was used to promote a right-wing po-
litical agenda and its implications have often therefore been exaggerated. One can never-
theless appreciate its scientific soundness without supporting the wild conjectures made 
by its ideological proponents.
3.2 Summary and critique 
Part 3 provided various examples for the use of behavioural phenomena to understand 
the effects of legal rules and the effects of evidence rules and law enforcement policies. 
Further it also indicated how the lawmakers and policymakers can make use of these 
phenomena in designing laws and policies. Note that this section illustrates a central fea-
ture of the behavioural analysis of law, namely, that in contrast to traditional or classical 
law and economics behavioural law and economics does not have a single unifying the-
ory. It is based on numerous empirical and experimental findings. Applying those to the 
field of criminal law often requires sensitivity to circumstances and context, and should 
be done with caution. Mechanical application of psychological and sociological findings 
without examining their relevance to the criminal context is often misguided.
The primary accusation of behavioural scientists is that traditional advocates of law 
and economics blinded themselves to the realities of law and criminality. More specifi-
cally they argue that criminals are not self-interest maximisers, and do not operate in the 
44 Ibid, p. 369.
45 Harcourt and Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and five-City Social Exper-
iment, in U. Chicago L. Rev. 73:271-74 (2006). Harcourt and Ludwig dispute the effectiveness of these 
methods.
46 See Kahan 1997 p. 356
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ways attributed to them by economists. At best, we ought to complement traditional law 
and economics by examining what the real beliefs and preferences of criminals are. At 
worst, we ought to reject some of the premises of economic models. This article identified 
numerous behavioural phenomena that are relevant to the analysis of criminal law. These 
phenomena are only representative illustrations and many more could be discussed. 
I wish to devote this part to raise some critical comments on the behavioural move-
ment and the applicability of its findings to criminal law. The behavioural analysis exam-
ined above is subject to criticisms of two types: internal and external. Among the internal 
criticisms, one may mention specifically what one theorist labelled ‘indeterminate biases’, 
namely the use of terms that acquire precise meanings only in specific contexts such as 
gains or losses in prospect theory.47 As illustrated above there is no natural way to classify 
punishment and it could be classified either as a loss if looked at separately or as a gain if 
looked at in conjunction with the gains resulting from the crime. This is not unique to the 
case of punishment, and it raises doubts as to the potential contribution of prospect theo-
ry to policy-making.48 Further it was pointed out that the multiplicity of biases generates 
uncertainty as some of these biases may offset one another. People may for instance be 
over-optimists (and therefore underestimate the probability of detection) but, at the same 
time, be subjected to an availability bias which leads them to overestimate the probability 
of detection. It is difficult to predict under such circumstances which among conflicting 
biases is stronger or more effective.49 
Beyond these internal objections, there is a sense that behavioural law and economics 
treats individuals mechanistically. Punishment is designed to ‘train’ the criminal. Con-
cepts such as autonomy or choice, which are so central to criminal law, do not have a 
place within the behavioural tradition. Ironically, in the long run this view may erode the 
effectiveness of criminal law and, in particular, the effectiveness of the stigma attached 
to crime. If criminal law is nothing but a system of incentives whose effectiveness hinges 
on manipulation, fraud and cognitive biases (rather than a system of norms designed to 
guide individuals and aid them in deliberating on what ought and what ought not to be 
done), individuals would inevitably lose any feelings of shame or guilt or respect towards 
the criminal law. Instead, they would treat criminal law in the same way they treat power-
ful thugs. Such thugs inevitably intimidate, but their judgments do not guide individuals 
and their commands are disobeyed whenever it is safe to do so. 
Last, some criminal law theorists believe that punishment is designed to cause pain 
to individuals and not only to deter them. Punishment is about retributive justice and it 
47 See Teichman 2011 pp. 1700 - 1704
48 For an attempt to address this objection, see Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, in Vanderbilt L. Rev. 65:829 
(2012) pp. 889 – 892. 
49 See Teichman 2011 pp. 1704 – 1706. 
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seems that retributivism has no place either in the classical law and economics tradition 
or in behavioural law and economics. 
4 Concluding remarks and future challenges
I will not deceive the reader by denying that the behavioural analysis of criminal law has 
so far had very limited effect on legal practice. There are very few fields in which econom-
ic analysis in general and behavioural analysis in particular had lesser impact than in the 
field of criminal law. 
Perhaps, as I argued in a different context, the reason is the great interest of the public 
in criminal law (in contrast to other more technical fields of law). Criminal law deals with 
murder, robbery, blood, and love and beneath the gowns of judges one can sense intense 
passions and human sentiments.50 The smell of blood, sweat and sperm can barely be 
disguised when criminal law is at stake. Economics and behavioural economics seem too 
impoverished to govern this field where death, blood, sex, love and hatred intermingle 
with each other. Perhaps philosophers rightly observe that retributivism is a primitive 
sentiment that ought to be overcome. But nobody has yet taught us how to do this, and 
the public and the legislature do not pay attention the pleadings of philosophers. 
Furthermore, beyond the positive or negative effects of criminal law prohibitions on 
human behaviour, it is still the case that the existence of criminal law prohibitions (inde-
pendent of what they are or what their effects are) serves, as Durkheim observed, to rein-
force social solidarity. Durkheim believed therefore that society needs crime. To illustrate 
why Durkheim said: 
Imagine a society of saints, perfect cloister of exemplary individuals, crimes, properly so called, 
will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same 
scandal that the ordinary offence does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, this society has the 
power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and treat them as such.51 
Criminal law is not merely a means of training and inducing individuals to behave; it 
maintains and protects the social framework. This function cannot easily be translated 
into the language of economics or psychology. 
These observations do not imply that economic or behavioural insights cannot be 
useful, but merely that their effects are at least ordinarily limited to the more technical 
aspects of criminal law, such as regulatory or white collar offences. Legal doctrine will 
continue to be governed by the Freudian id rather than by the rational ideals of social 
50 See Harel 2012. 
51 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, translation by Solovay and Mueller, ed. Catlin (Free Press of 
Glencoe 1964). 
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scientists. I also dare say that this is not merely a prediction but also a hope. Criminal 
law is the field where the ideals of freedom and autonomy are particularly important. As 
mentioned above, the behavioural approach sharply conflicts with this view; criminal law 
is understood to be about training individuals to behave according to the norms rather 
than teach them about what is right and wrong and guide them in their moral delibera-
tions. Such an approach undermines the pretence of the criminal law to guide us, to aid 
in deliberating and to provide an inspiration.
This is but an example of a gap in the literature on the behavioural analysis of law. 
More specifically I want to urge social scientists and legal theorists to think harder what 
the normative significance of our preferences is. Precisely as in the context of criminal 
law I pointed out a tension between the ideals of autonomy and freedom of choice and 
the behavioural approach to criminal law, so such tensions can be found in other fields. 
Contract law theorists influenced by behavioural studies urge us to differentiate between 
our ‘true’ preferences and those resulting from cognitive biases. Ultimately to know what 
we really want, we ought to launder the preferences and beliefs, to purify them. But the 
more successful behavioural scientists are in pointing out biases and misperceptions the 
less the faith one has in the very existence of independent and authentic preferences that 
merit respect.
